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Perkins and Levinson: Partnership accounting in a nineteenth century merchant banking house

Edwin J. Perkins
and
Sherry Levinson
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

PARTNERSHIP ACCOUNTING IN A NINETEENTH
CENTURY MERCHANT BANKING HOUSE
Abstract: This article focuses on the contents of two nineteenth-century letters
which discuss the allocation of income among the partners of a leading AngloAmerican merchant banking firm, the House of Brown. The writers debate alternative methods of valuing assets and determining yearly income. In addition, the
handling of doubtful accounts and their subsequent collection is examined. In both
letters the writers argue for the development of clearly defined accounting principles and consistency in applying them. These letters reveal that an unusually high
degree of financial sophistication had emerged in the merchant banking field by
the 1850s.

While much of the recent historical literature has been devoted
to analyses of business and railroad operations in the nineteenth
century, the accounting methods and contributions of banking firms
have remained relatively unexplored.1 Now two previously unpublished letters written in the mid-nineteenth century by partners of
the House of Brown, a leading Anglo-American merchant banking
firm, offer new insight into the evolution of accounting methods
and the emerging degree of sophistication in accounting thought.
These letters indicate that some of the senior members of the firm
were acutely aware of the problems associated with the development of principles and procedures for determining and allocating
partnership profits in an equitable and consistent manner. The
issues which stimulated discussion within the firm were controversies over, first, alternative methods of valuing assets and consequently the calculation of yearly income and, second, the collection of funds on doubtful accounts which had been written off
directly against the senior partners' capital accounts. In both letters
the writers expressed very conservative attitudes about the valuation of assets and the measurement of income.
The firm was founded in 1800 by Alexander Brown, who emigrated
to Baltimore from Ireland in the 1790s. Beginning as a linen merchant, Brown soon expanded his activities to include the merchan-
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dising of other products, shipping, and the provision of various
financial services. His four sons eventually joined the business, and
by 1825 three of them had established branches of the partnership in Philadelphia, New York, and Liverpool.2 By midcentury, the
firm had become the market leader in two major Anglo-American
financial markets—the issuance of letters of credit to American
importers and the buying and selling of foreign exchange in the
United States. Profits were so high in these specialized fields that
the two senior partners who held the bulk of the firm's capital—
William Brown in Liverpool and James Brown in New York—
decided, in the 1850s, to embark on a program of diversification
by making "outside" investments in railroad securities, transatlantic passenger ships (the famous Collins Line), and other
properties. Some of the junior partners opposed these outside investments calling them unduly speculative; the leaders of this
group were two non-family members of the firm residing in England,
Francis Hamilton and Mark Collet (later Governor of the Bank of
England), who had assumed day-to-day administrative control of
the Liverpool branch in 1853.
Eventually, many of these peripheral investments did, in fact,
decline in market value, just as Collet and Hamilton had feared.
This setback intensified the debate within the partnership about
the merits of investing partnership funds in railroad stocks and
bonds. It led to discussions of the valuation of assets generally. As
the following letter from Collet and Hamilton so succinctly reveals,
the problem of declining asset values stimulated a lively discussion
about the application of a "cost or market" approach in determining
the partnership's income for 1856:3
Persia

Private
Liverpool 12 Nov. 1856

Messers Brown Brothers & Co.
New York
Dear Sirs:
We exceedingly regret that there should exist between us any
difference of opinion, as to the mode of treating assets, not immediately convertible, in the yearly statement of accounts, but we trust
the difference may be rather apparent than real, & that you have
only misunderstood our meaning.
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What we intended to propose was not that every asset should be
absolutely sold & turned into actual Cash on the 30 Novr. & that
every asset not so converted should be written off to Profit & Loss;
but, that every asset should be reduced on the Books to such a
sum as it could, beyond a doubt, be actually sold for, within a
reasonable space (say of weeks or months, but not of years); and
that everything beyond such actual money value—whether the
assets be absolutely worthless, or only doubtful—should be written
off. In fact, as we view it, there is only one process by which the
profits of a current business can be "ascertained"; namely by
comparing the liabilities with the assets, after both have been reduced to their cash value on the day, up to which the profits are
to be calculated; by means of the interest account this is done most
accurately with the Liabilities; but, if in dealing with the Assets;
prospective values are applied to them which may or may not be
realized at some future day, instead of bringing them to their
present Cash value, a totally different standard is at once applied
to the assets, & the result can only show an amount of "assumed",
but not of "ascertained" profits.
We are not insensible to the disadvantage which under our
present partnership agreement might accrue to the heirs of a
junior partner by this strict course; and W m Brown, having his attention drawn to it by your remarks, is willing & suggests that a
supplementary article should be introduced to preserve to the heirs
of juniors their just interest in the Bad Debt Account; and he writes
to his brother to this effect by the present conveyance.
On the other hand it may not perhaps have occurred to you that
if assets are left on the Books at nominal amounts beyond their convertible value, the Senior Partners are placed at a corresponding
disadvantage under their obligation to pay off a junior in Cash at the
rate of the previous years profits; which would of course have been
less had the assets been appraised upon what appears to us the
only sound principle.
Further, for the last three or four years, large amounts have had
to be written off annually to supply the inadequate provisions made
for Bad Debts, at the time they occurred; & upon these sums, which
for the time swelled the profits, we have been all along paying a
heavy Income tax.
But all such questions as these are quite minor & unimportant
when compared with the grand objection, that by retaining assets
on the Books at sums [other] than their convertible value, & so
dividing profits which have not been fully earned, a most insidious
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& deceptive principle is admitted, which has no single advantage
to recommend it, but on the contrary is fraught with serious dangers.
Within our own memory American Houses that
felt fully confident of their position, as we do now, have been brought to ruin by it;
first bolstering up questionable accounts or bad debts with fresh
advances, instead of facing out the loss at first, and then retaining
the assets upon their Books at nominal values, which, if they were
not purely arbitrary, could only have been realized under some
concurrence of circumstances, which was waited for in vain; in the
meantime they shut their eyes to the dangers of a system, which
could not be remedied except at a serious sacrifice, until it slowly,
but surely, brought them down. Smaller concerns, from their limited
means are comparatively exempt from this risk; but it is the peculiar
snare which lies in the way of large Houses with extensive means
& unbounded credit, and in this light it does seem to us of vital
importance that we should not give place to so dangerous a principle in any form or shape. We have no other object that the common interest of all in urging these views upon you, & we sincerely
trust that they will of themselves receive your approbation & be
adopted.
We are,
Dear Sirs
Yours faithfully,
Brown Shipley & Co.
Although it is impossible to determine exactly what developments
and forces influenced the Liverpool partners' consideration of accounting principles, this correspondence did coincide with several
legislative alterations in English financial laws. The Joint Stock
Companies Act of 1856 passed Parliament just prior to the writing
of this letter. Because the new law prescribed new financial practices for certain business organizations, public discussion of the
act had stimulated in England a reappraisal of basic accounting
concepts.4
Specifically, the Joint Stock Companies Act required that the
directors of each corporation "cause true Accounts to be kept":
Of the Stock in Trade of the Company; Of the Sums of
Money received and expended by the Company, and the
Matter in respect of which such Receipt and Expenditure
takes place; and Of the Credits and Liabilities of the Company.5

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol7/iss1/5

4

Perkins and Levinson: Partnership accounting in a nineteenth century merchant banking house

Perkins and Levinson: Partnership Accounting

63

The annual presentation of income statements was required so that
"a just Balance of Profit and Loss may be laid before the Meeting."
Furthermore, the act specified that "a Balance Sheet shall be made
out in every Year, and laid before the General Meeting of the Company, and such Balance Sheet shall contain a Summary of the
Property and Liabilities of the Company. . ." 6
The act did not specifically address the issue of valuation of
assets nor did it detail the preparation of financial statements.
However, the mere fact that for the first time presentation of accurate financial statements was required by law may have stimulated
discussion of accounting principles.
Aside from these legislative actions, we have been unable to
discover any direct stimulus for Hamilton and Collet's interest in
the lower of cost or market principle. However, the principle had
clearly been introduced into accounting thought by the mid-nineteenth century. A. C. Littleton in an article, "The Geneology of
Lower of Cost or Market," traces application of the principle to
fourteenth-century Italy, when a very heavy tax burden may have
been an incentive for recognizing all possible losses.7 During the
seventeenth century French businessmen seem to have adopted
the practice of writing down slow inventories, but Littleton argues
that it was done primarily for the purpose of determining the degree
of solvency. By 1862, J. Sawyer referred to the "recognized principle that stock should be valued at least at cost price (unless
depreciated in value) and that no profit should be estimated until
realized." 8 Meanwhile, we are unaware of any Anglo-American accounting literature that discusses the issue of lower of cost or
market in terms of its impact on the measurement of income. It is
conceivable that Collet and Hamilton's letter represents one of the
earliest preserved discussions of this topic.
In a second letter written four years later, Collet and Hamilton
focused on inconsistencies in the handling of bad debts and subsequent collections on delinquent accounts:9
Niagaria

Private
Liverpool 24 March
1860

Messers Brown Brothers & Co.
New York
Dear Sirs:
Referring to your private letter of 5 March about the private
accounts, we see nothing to remark upon, except this: there ap-
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pears to us an inconsistency in the principles upon which some
accounts are brought under the operation of the Suspense Account
& others excluded; we do not wish to raise the question by correspondence; indeed it could never have arisen had the principle
been clearly defined in 1857, on what terms the Seniors assumed
the Juniors' losses; but to illustrate the inconsistency that presents
itself to our minds, we could say that if all the Surplus that may be
realized from Mathison & Litchfield is to go to Credit of the
Suspense Acct, (even beyond the amount specifically written off in
1857) then the loss written off in 1859 for the Thompson property
should have gone to the Suspense A / c too; but if the latter was
properly charged to Profit & Loss A/c, then any recoveries beyond
the Sums which were specifically written off in 1857 should revert
to the Profit & Loss account of the year when the recovery is
made. The question in fact turns upon this — whether the Seniors
guaranteed the Juniors for losses beyond what the Am t . placed to
Suspense A / c 1857 would satisfy? If they did, then they should
bear the loss upon Thompson's property, on the ground that it
was a lock-up, left standing at an estimated value; & then too they
are entitled to all recoveries from the assets as they then stood;
but if, as we conceived at the time—the Seniors did not engage to
supply anything more (if needed) than the Suspense account would
suffice to cover, then the loss [on] Thompson's property has been
correctly charged last year to Profit & Loss; but then also the
recoveries beyond losses specifically provided for (& not left to
be worked out under the gross estimate) should also go to Profit
& Loss. It is inconvenient now to settle the point when there is no
longer any doubt as to the out-turn of the Suspense Account, viz.
that it will be more than sufficient to pay all losses, and of the two
original alternatives only one remains; and we do not wish or ask
you to discuss it by letter; but only to settle it on your side before
Mr. J. M. Brown comes out, so that we can have an understanding
about it, when we can discuss it verbally.
Yours faithfully,
Brown Shipley & Co.
To place this second item of correspondence in the proper context, it is necessary to know that during the financial panic of 1857
many American importers holding letters of credit from AngloAmerican merchant bankers got into serious financial difficulties.
In many cases the merchant banking firms in England who had
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faithfully met their obligations under letter of credit agreements
were not fully reimbursed by their American customers. Because
the Browns had been cautious in issuing letters of credit and had
usually insisted on a margin of 20 percent in tangible assets against
contingent liabilities arising under their letters of credit, the firm
had weathered this crisis in much better shape than most competitors. Nonetheless, the firm did face the possibility of absorbing
some losses. In these cases, the Browns retained the assets assigned to them as an initial margin and occasionally they received
additional collateral from importers hoping to survive the panic.
To record these immediate losses and potential losses, the
Brown partnership used at least two different methods.10 Some
moderate losses were simply written off against the partnership's
profit and loss statement in 1857. In this instance, the losses were
shared by both the junior and senior partners according to the
pre-arranged agreement about the allocation of profits and losses.
In the second method, the senior partners, James and William
Brown, agreed to permit writeoffs against their individual capital
accounts. Debits were made to a "suspense account" which was a
contra-account to the senior partners' capital accounts. The goal
of this magnanimous policy was to protect the other members of
the partnership from the possibility of incurring unusually high
losses in the event most of the questionable debts in 1857 were
never fully collected. The amounts written off to the seniors' capital
accounts were normally only a portion of a specific account that
was considered doubtful, and the remaining balance was left standing on the partnership's balance sheet at its currently "estimated"
value. This procedure seems to have been at the root of the problems which arose in later years.
By 1860 the House of Brown had recovered nearly all the
amounts written off to the suspense accounts of 1857. At this point,
questions emerged about how to record the recovery of the collected amounts. In those cases in which the senior partners had
assumed personal liability for at least a partial loss on a specific
account, it was not clear whether the collected amount was to be
credited in its entirety to their contra-accounts or whether that sum
should be divided as follows—with an amount credited to the suspense accounts equal to the original writeoff and the excess
credited to the general partnership. The question could be stated
as follows: at the time of the debits to the capital contra-accounts
was there created thereby an implied agreement that the senior
partners had assumed full responsibility for all potential losses on
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the designated accounts? If that interpretation was correct, then
Collet and Hamilton felt that the seniors were indeed entitled to
benefit individually from all sums collected, including the amounts
above original writeoffs. But, on the other hand, if the senior
partners had assumed liability for only a portion of the potential
loss on a specific account, then any excess should accrue instead
to the general partnership.
Because the matter had never been settled in 1857, uncertainties
remained about accounting procedures. In their letter Collet and
Hamilton noted that in 1859 the firm had finally recognized a loss
on the Thompson account which was in excess of the amount
originally placed in the senior partners' suspense accounts. In
that case, the additional loss was charged to the partnership accounts and was consequently borne by all members of the firm.
Now in 1860, the seniors proposed to credit all the sums collected
from Mathison & Litchfield to their contra-accounts, including the
amounts beyond the original writeoff. Collet and Hamilton felt that
the handling of the two situations was inconsistent.
Unfortunately, we do not know how this matter was finally resolved. Yet it is interesting to note the intricacies which surrounded
the drafting and interpretation of partnership agreements formulated
over 100 years ago. Although we cannot point in this case to any
external events which might have stimulated this discussion, we
are aware of several developments inside the firm that almost certainly played some role in encouraging an interest in refining accounting procedures.
By the 1850s, the House of Brown was no longer a small family
business, but a medium-sized enterprise with seven branch offices
and several non-family members. Moreover, all the members were
committed to preserving the business for their heirs, which suggests
the emerging concept of an on-going concern. Because the firm
actually had two main offices—one in New York and another in
Liverpool—there was internal pressure to commit all major policies
and operating rules to paper for later reference. The rapidly increasing volume of business after midcentury also placed greater
demands on regularizing procedures. Part of this process was the
desire by some firm members for a uniform, well-specified system
of accounting. In concert, these factors made preestablished rules
increasingly desirable for continued harmony within the partnership.
Collet and Hamilton were among the most vocal advocates of
the benefits of uniformity. In both letters, they lamented the ab-
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sence of consistency in handling the partnership accounts; in 1860,
they argued that "had the principle been clearly defined" at the
outset, the subsequent debate could have been avoided. The problems of maintaining consistency demonstrates clearly the growing
need for outside accounting authorities and specialists, who could
relieve the partners of the additional burden of establishing the
firm's own accounting criteria. Since neither England nor the
United States had an active accounting association in the 1850s,
it became the responsibility of individual managers to establish
their own rules for valuing assets, measuring income, and handling
doubtful accounts.
From another historical perspective, it is intriguing to examine
the interchange of accounting thought between the United States
and Great Britain. Previously, James Edwards has argued that
"just as customs, common law, and commercial practice came
to the United States from England and Scotland, so did the practice
of accountancy." 11 In contrast, R. A. Irish favors the United States
as the source of much fresh thinking about accounting principles:
"This new country, uninhibited by tradition, brought forth an examination of accounting fundamentals which was free of inborn
European prejudices." 12 In this one instance, the letters originated
in England, however, which raises questions about Irish's views but
supports Edward's position. More research on the origin of fresh
accounting thinking is clearly in order.
In conclusion, these two letters offer insights on the evolution of
accounting practices and thought during the mid-nineteenth
century. The debate inside the Brown firm focused on the drafting
and amending of a fair partnership agreement and the judicious
interpretation of its provisions. The letters provide evidence of the
increased emphasis on the measurement and distribution of income. The letters indicate that the increased complexity and larger
volume of business led many partners to attempt to establish
permanent guidelines for accounting procedures which might avoid
ad hoc discussions of financial principles in future years. In formulating and applying these guidelines, Francis Hamilton and Mark
Collet, two of the firm's non-family, English partners, saw consistency as a crucial factor. In addition, they advocated a conservative attitude toward valuing assets on the firm's balance sheet
and in the measurement of income. Finally, this need for consistent,
standardized procedures later spread throughout the business environment and created a favorable climate for the establishment
of a cohesive accounting profession.
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FOOTNOTES
1

G. A. Lee, "The Concept of Profit in British Accounting, 1760-1900," Business
History Review (September, 1975), provides a general survey of the advance of
accounting principles during this period. Other sources which provide background
are Edey and Panitakdi, "British Company Accounting and the Law: 1844-1900," in
Littleton and Yamey, eds., Studies in the History of Accounting (Homewood, Ill.:
R. D. Irwin, Inc., 1956); M. Chatfield, A History of Accounting Thought (Hinsdale,
Ill., Dryden Press, 1974); Nicholas Stacey, English Accountancy: A Study in Social
and Economic History, 1800-1954 (London: Gee, 1954); and A. C. Littleton, Accounting Evolution to 1900 (New York: Russell & Russell, 1966).
2
The history of the firm is found in Edwin J. Perkins, Financing Anglo-American
Trade, 1800-1880 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975).
3
Brown Brothers Harriman & Co. Papers.
4
ln the chapter entitled "Development of Experts in Accounts," A. C. Littleton,
in his Accounting Evolution to 1900, discusses the ebb and flow of business during
the nineteenth century and correlates these movements with the growth of social
control through statutory regulation of public works and joint stock companies.
5
Collection of the Public General Statutes, p. 433.
6
Collection of the Public General Statutes, pp. 433-434.
7
A. C. Littleton, "A Genealogy for Cost or Market," The Accounting Review
(June, 1941). For further discussion of the history of this principle see R. H.
Parker, "Lower of Cost or Market in Britain and the United States: An Historical
Survey," Abacus, I (1965), and Kenneth O. Elvick, "Acquisition Cost Versus Revaluation: A Historical Perspective," The International Journal of Accounting, IX (1974).
8
Sawyer, p. 158.
9
Brown Brothers Harriman & Co. Papers.
10
For discussions on the use of reserves for bad debts, see M. Chatfield, A History of Accounting Thought, p. 83, and A. C. Littleton, Accounting Thought to 1900,
p. 301.
11
Edwards, p. 144.
12
lrish, p. 63. Also see G. J. Previts, "Origins of American Accounting," The
CPA Journal, XLCI (May, 1976).
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